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ABSTRACT 
After large-scale natural disasters, governments must procure enormous 
amounts of many sorts efficiently without delay by concluding the discrete contracts. 
In addition, these procurements should not impede recovery by individual in 
market economies. In this paper, by focusing Japanese temporary housing program 
after East Japan Earthquake, I consider the important factors necessary to achieve 
desired public procurement during emergency period. After explaining Japanese 
pre-disaster rules and post-disaster response after the earthquake, I show that the 
price of temporary house was influenced heavily by the introduction of ad hoc 
program using a statistic analysis. Based on this discussion, I point out that this ad 
hoc policy may cause time-inconsistency problem, and adverse impact on the 
prevention for hazards. In this meaning, to maintain time-consistency is very 
important for executing public procurement after hazards. 
(*) In the process of this research, I conducted surveys based on interviews to Iwate prefecture (on 5th 
September, 2011), Sumida town in Iwate prefecture (on 7 th September, 2011) and JAPC (on 7th 
February, 2012). I would like to thank Mr. S.Tanifuji, Mr. T.Miura (Iwate Prefecture), Mr. K.Tada, Mr. 
N.Kanno (Sumida town), Mr. N.Takahashi, Mr. J.Kikuchi, Mr. H.Sora (JAPC) for providing useful 
information about temporary housing program. 
t professor of Economics, Kobe City University of Foreign Studies, 9-1 Gakuen-Higashi-machi, 
Nishi-ku, Kobe 651-2187, JAPAN. E-mail: 
1. INTRODUCTION 
On March 11, 2011, a very large.::scale earthquake, of 9.0 magnitude on the 
Richter scale, struck the northeast part of Japan. Because the epicenter of the 
earthquake was at the bottom of the sea, the tsunami produced by the quake surged 
toward the coast of the Tohoku district. This powerful tsunami killed thousands of 
people and destroyed various types of structures in the district. In addition, the 
subsequent meltdown of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, due to the 
earthquake and tsunami, forced a prolonged evacuation of the residents of the 
surrounding areas for several months. 
Although Japan has often experienced many large earthquakes, the East 
Japan Earthquake demonstrated remarkable characteristics different from past 
earthquakes. First, the damage that resulted from the earthquake was enormous 
for a developed country. Table 1 shows the extent of the damage caused by the 
quake. Compared with the damage brought by the Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in 
1995 that caused large-scale devastation, the East Japan Earthquake was 
significantly greater both in terms of loss of human life and physical destruction. 
Second, it is worth noting that the East Japan Earthquake affected vast areas. In 
fact, according to the Japanese National Police Agency, this quake caused loss of life 
in 12 (13) prefectures, although the main stricken areas were Iwate, Miyagi, and 
Fukushima prefectures. Third, as a result of the nuclear power plant accident, the 
situation with regard to damage became more complex. Especially, in Fukushima 
prefecture, those harmed were affected not only by the earthquake and/or tsunami 
but also by the radioactive materials. 
<See Table 1> 
In general, after large-scale natural disasters, governments must procure 
enormous amounts of different sorts of materials efficiently and without delay. In 
addition to this, because those adversely affected by natural disasters are required 
to rebuild their lives as quickly as possible using their own resources in market 
economies, their recovery should not be impeded by public procurement efforts. 
However, these objectives are often in conflict with each other during an emergency 
period. For example, relief procurement is an urgent matter, but the pursuit of this 
objective may mean forgoing the competition between bidders that is necessary to 
attain efficiency. Therefore, as Thai (2007) pointed out, governments may face 
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trade-off: prompt procurement versus efficient procurement m emergency 
contracting. 
The purpose of this paper is to consider the important factors that achieve a 
balance among different objectives by focusing on the Japanese public procurement 
after the East Japan Earthquake. Although the types of procurement after a 
natural disaster are extremely diverse, they can be divided into two groups: 
procurement for rehabilitation and that for relief. Obviously, the former requires a 
lot of time and is ongoing, whereas the latter is completed within a relatively short 
time. Hence, with regard to the latter, we focus on the public procurement of 
temporary housing whose data I was able to collect systematically. 
Many studies have been conducted on the temporary housing programs during 
post-disaster periods (For example, see Bolin & Stanford (1991), Davis (1977), 
Quarantelli (1995)). However, these literatures mainly focus on the recurrent 
cultural and sociological issues involved in the programs. Recently, Johnson (2007) 
emphasized the necessity of (ex ante) strategic planning for temporary housing. 
Although she pointed out important considerations for the procurement of 
temporary housing, her approach does not mainly focus on the issues of public 
procurement. Only a very few researches approach the temporary housing 
programs from the perspective of public procurement. 
In this paper, we discuss the importance of consistency between pre-disaster 
rules and post-disaster response for executing public procurement during an 
emergency period. As Kydland & Prescott (1977) showed in the macroeconomics 
field, it is well known that the time-inconsistency problem between rules and 
discretionary policy, that is, the best action to be taken given the current situation, 
is an obstacle to attaining optimal economic performance. In the following, we show 
that the Japanese government's post-disaster response for procuring temporary 
houses may have caused a time-inconsistency problem because of its ad hoc 
planning. Section 2 explains the Japanese pre-disaster rules for the supply of 
temporary housing. Section 3 discusses the post-disaster procurement policy 
pursued by the Japanese government after the East Japan Earthquake. Section 4 
clarifies the determinant of the price of temporary housing, through a statistical 
analysis that uses the collected data on the supply of temporary housing. Section 5 
shows that the lack of consistency between pre-disaster rules and post-disaster 
response may produce confusion with regard to the supply of temporary housing. 
Section 6 concludes. 
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2. JAPANESE PRE-DISASTER (EX ANTE) RULES OF RELIEF 
In general, countries have an institutional system of hazard prevention and 
preparedness in order to effectively minimize the damage from them. Because this 
system prescribes the scope of responsibility and the method of governmental 
response after a disaster, it is described as the pre-disaster (ex ante) rules for public 
procurement after disasters. These rules take various forms such as laws, 
guidelines, plans, agreements, and precedents. Thus, we define pre-disaster rules as 
the codified information the government refers to when faced with a disaster and on 
which people expect that the government's responses will be based. In this section, 
we shall explain the Japanese pre-disaster rules, focusing especially on the 
procurement of temporary houses that are provided to affected persons as part of 
relief aid following a disaster. 
Needless to say, the basis of Japanese pre-disaster rules is the law. Japan's 
Basic Law of Measures against Disaster, which is the most basic law on hazard 
prevention, determines where the responsibility lies and prescribes various 
measures aimed at the prevention of damage. Especially, this law requires that 
every local government have in place a plan to cope with disasters (Regional Plan 
for Prevention of Damage). Its principles are "the principle of complementarity" and 
"the principle of providing goods in kind." The former means that the lower level of 
government near the affected areas is responsible for dealing with any hazard. Only 
when the damage caused by a disaster is so large that the lower level government 
cannot deal with it, does the upper level of government provide physical and 
financial assistance to the affected areas. On the other hand, the latter means that 
the government should support affected persons not by giving pecuniary aid but by 
providing goods and services in kind, except in the case of the Law for Supporting 
the Rebuilding of Disaster Victims' Livelihood 1, which was enacted after the 
Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake. The Japanese government adheres to this principle 
that is based on the idea that government should not contribute to increasing 
private property. 
Japan's Disaster Relief Law, whose principle is based on Japan's Basic Law of 
1 This law is enacted in purpose of supporting for sufferers by natural disasters to recovery their living 
by their own efforts. The affected person entitled to be supported by this law receives financial aids by 
the prefecture. 
3 
Measures against Disaster, describes the concrete relief activities that the 
government should engage in immediately after a natural disaster. This law 
requires the prefecture where the disaster occurred to embark on nine concrete 
activities2 • On the basis of this law, the government procures goods and services 
necessary to engage in these activities. The supply of temporary houses for affected 
persons that we shall focus on is included in the above-mentioned nine activities. 
A concrete method of procuring is described in the guidelines, plans, 
agreements, and precedents. In the case of the temporary housing program, the 
Japanese government has formulated The Guidelines Related to the Supply of 
Temporary Houses and clarified the following: the persons eligible under the 
program, the specifications of houses (within 29.8 m2 per house), upper limit of the 
cost of the main parts of the houses that the government can subsidize (within 
2,387,000 yen ($29,838)), the time of starting construction (within 20 days after the 
disaster) and the term for which the houses will be provided (2 years). However, in 
the case of a large-scale natural disaster, it may be very difficult for the government 
(prefecture) to adhere to these criteria. Therefore, in that case, the Japanese 
government determines special criteria by considering the situation of affected 
persons in the related prefectures, referring to precedents set in the responses to 
other natural disasters. Because these criteria are not necessarily detailed, there is 
ample room for the government to pursue a discretionary policy after a large-scale 
natural disaster. 
The prefecture makes the actual procurement of goods after a natural disaster 
on the basis of the Regional Plan for Prevention of Damage formulated by each local 
government that describes the process for procurement of goods and services. The 
government often concludes appropriate agreements (Agreement for Aid after 
Disaster) with the industry associations for it to procure various goods and services 
in order to execute the plan. Thus, actual procurement often progresses in line with 
these agreements. Typically, the government concludes discrete contracts with the 
association or member of the association, and engages in the actual procurement. 
In the case of the temporary housing program, each prefecture concludes an 
agreement with the Japan Association of Prefab Construction (JAPC) in order to 
2 The kinds of relief that should be provided by the prefecture are as follows: a) provision of facilities 
for victims (including temporary houses), b) supply offood and drink, c) supply of necessities of life, d) 
provision of medical and birthing services, e) rescue operations, :0 temporary repair of damaged houses, 
g) provision of work tools h) provision of school supplies, i) provision of burial service. 
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supply temporary houses after a disaster. In fact, as figure 1 shows, all 47 
prefectures in Japan have concluded this agreement with it currently. Note that this 
agreement was entered into by several prefectures after the Hanshin-Awaji 
Earthquake in 1995. According to this agreement, JAPe introduces to the prefecture 
the construction firms that can supply the . temporary houses at specified 
construction sites, and the prefecture concludes discrete contracts with the relevant 
construction firms. Typically, the member firms that belong to the standardized 
construction section of JAPe 3, which specializes in the supply of temporary 
constructions, supply the temporary houses after a disaster. However, when the 
necessary number of temporary houses exceeds the capacity of these member firms, 
the prefecture concludes contracts with other member firms of JAPe on the basis of 
this association's recommendation. In addition, in this case, the prefecture also 
chooses suppliers after inviting tenders from the public. Moreover, the local government such 
as city and town can procure temporary houses by its own budget. 
<See Figure 1> 
3. POST-DISASTER RESPONSE 
Mter the East Japan Earthquake, the Japanese government and local 
governments in the affected areas began procuring goods and services for relief 
activities on the basis of the ex-ante rules mentioned in the previous section. 
Obviously, since this disaster caused very extensive damage, the Japanese 
government helped local governments (prefectures) with the procurement of 
temporary housing, as it did after the Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake. Table 2 shows 
the main events and response related to the temporary housing program. As this 
table shows, with help from the Japanese government, the prefectures in the 
affected areas required the industrial associations of housing (mainly the 
standardized construction section of JAPe) to supply temporary houses in line with 
pre-disaster rules. As a result, by the end of March, not only had the construction of 
houses begun, but the number of temporary houses that should be constructed was 
also calculated. In fact, on March 31, 2011, the Japanese government announced 
3 JAPC consists of the following three sections according to the main business area: standard 
construction section, housing section, and PC construction section. 
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that the planned number of temporary houses was 72,290 (18,000 III Iwate 
Prefecture/ 30,000 in Miyagil24,000 in Fukushima). 
<See Table 2> 
However, the environment of the shelter, school, or community center where 
those affected by the disaster typically evacuated, as the first-stage place of refuge 
after the disaster, was very inferior. Thus, the government was under pressure to 
supply urgently the second-stage place of evacuation. On the other hand, there were 
difficulties in finding building sites for the construction of temporary houses. In 
order to overcome this situation, the Japanese government announced the 
introduction of the "deemed" temporary housing program on April 30. This program 
provided for affected persons to rent a flat for themselves, which was then deemed 
as a temporary house under certain conditions, and the responsibility for paying the 
rent for the flat would be borne by the government for two years. Table 3 presents 
the data on the first-stage and second-stage evacuation after the East Japan 
Earthquake. As this table shows, with this program's introduction, there was a 
rapid transition from first-stage evacuation to second-stage in June and July, while 
the supply of temporary houses remained at half the planned number4. In fact, 
according to the Japan Reconstruction Agency ("The transition of the number of 
"deemed" temporary houses"), there were 54,244 houses in use in the three main 
affected prefectures under this program on September 7, which amounted to about 
60% of the total temporary houses that affected persons lived in as second-stage 
evacuation (see table 3). 
<See Table 3> 
This program seems desirable, but it was an ad hoc response planned after the 
disaster. This type of policy often produces unfavorable side effects. In fact, this 
program encouraged disaster victims to substitute "deemed" temporary houses for 
"typical" ones. As a result, the Japanese government was forced to revise the 
planned number of temporary houses downward from 72,290 to 52,200 on May 19. 
Especially, in the three main affected prefectures, the planned number was revised 
4 According to JAPe documents, the number of temporary houses completed was 19,670 on June 17 
and 22,869 on July 17. 
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from 18,000 to 14,000 in Iwate, from 30,000 to 23,000 in Miyagi, and from 24,000 to 
15,200 in Fukushima. Because this downward revision amounted to about 30% of 
the original number, it led to "demand shock" among the suppliers of temporary 
houses. We will analyze the impact of this shock empirically in the next section. 
More importantly, this program may have deviated from the Japanese 
pre-disaster rules. As pointed out in the previous section, these pre-disaster rules 
apply the principle that the governments only provide goods and services in kind for 
victims. Moreover, the rules prohibit in principle that the governments provide 
pecuniary aid directly to affected persons except in the case of the Law for 
Supporting the Rebuilding of Disaster Victims' Livelihood. The private flats rented 
by the government were provided as one type of temporary housing since the 
Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, but to adopt the policy in which the flat rented by the 
victim herself is interpreted as a temporary house was novel in Japan. Although 
this program satisfies formally pre-disaster rule by changing from the contract 
between sufferer and lessor to one between government and lessor, the affected 
person who uses this program is given a type of "voucher" for the temporary house. 
Thus, this program factually deviates from the Japanese ex-ante rule for disaster. 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE TEMPORARY HOUSING PROGRAM AFTER 
THE EAST JAPAN EARTHQUAKE 
What impacts did the post-disaster responses mentioned in the previous section give on 
the effective prices oftemporary housing that reflects trade-off between urgency and efficiency? 
In this section, we shall examine this question using simple regression analysis of the systematic 
data on temporary houses procurement. In the case of their procurement, governments 
(prefectures) enter into a discrete contract with a construction firm. Considering that this 
discrete contract is concluded for each temporary housing complex, I collected information on 
each complex and constructed systematic data on the temporary housing in the three main 
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affected prefectures (lwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima)5. This dataset consists of the information 
on 942 complexes (51,207 houses) in 3 prefectures, which amounts to 96.5% of the total 
planned number (53,077 houses). The data I collected on each complex are as follows: the 
number of houses, the number of meeting places and parlors, date of contract, the amount as 
stated in the contract, the name of the supplier, whether the contract is based on a lease or sale, 
whether the procurement is based on inviting tenders from the public. 
Note that dependent variable, the effective prices of temporary housing, should consider 
the trade-off between urgency and efficiency. To this end, I define the dependent variable as the 
following: 
10g(ZPRICE)=log(the price per temporary house/(730-dates of contract from the disaster) 
dates of contracts from disaster are measured by the date elapsed from the disaster 
Because the term for which the houses will be provided is 2 years (730days), ZPRICE is 
interpreted as the price of residual housing service. Note that this variable is smaller when the 
price of temporary houses is lower (procurement is efficient) and when the procurement is more 
promptly (procurement is conducted urgently). 
Governments negotiate with suppliers in the process of concluding the discrete contracts, 
so the effective price of the temporary houses depends on the market environment, the 
characteristics of the complex, and the nature of the contract. Regarding the market environment, 
we pay attention to two variables in the statistical analysis. One is the monthly effective ratio of 
job vacancies to job applicants (LABOR), which is available in each affected prefecture6 • 
Obviously, constructing the temporary housing requires many construction workers. Because an 
increase in this ratio means a tighter relation between supply and demand in the labor market, it 
is expected that the effective price of temporary housing has a positive relation to this ratio. The 
other is a variable (DEMAND), which represents negative demand shock brought about by the 
5 I collected the data from the following sources: a) Iwate prefecture, The official gazette of Iwate 
prefecture, no.l1l15 (on l1th November, 20l1), b) Iwate prefecture, "On the plan progressing for the 
construction of temporary houses" (on 15th December, 20l1), c) Miyagi prefecture, "The list of the 
temporary houses in Miyagi prefecture" (on 18th January, 2012), d) Fukushima prefecture, "The 
number of starting construction of temporary houses" (on 1st February, 2012). I complemented 
insufficiency of the data in Miyagi and Fukushima prefectures by requesting disclosure of information 
to the prefectures. 
6 In Japan the Labour Bureau in each prefecture discloses this data. In addition, the ratios are 
seasonally adjusted figures. 
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introduction of the "deemed" temporary housing program mentioned in the previous section. 
Considering that this program led to the downward revision of the planned number of temporary 
houses, we construct a dummy variable weighted by the scale of the downward revision. For 
example, in Iwate prefecture, the original number of houses planned was 18,000, but the 
Japanese government announced it had been revised to 14,000 on May 19. In this case, we 
assign 1 to the contract concluded before May 19 in Iwate prefecture, whereas we assign 
14,000118,000 to the one after May 29. Because this shock meant a decrease in the demand for 
temporary housing, we could expect that the effective price of housing would have a negative 
relation to this variable. 
Regarding the characteristics of the complex, we consider three variables. The first 
variable is the number of houses of the complex (HOUSES). In general, since the construction 
of a large-scale complex enjoys economies of scale by means of the division of labor, an 
increase in the number of houses decreases the construction cost per house and leads to a fall in 
price. The second variable is the number of meeting places and parlors contained in the complex 
(MEETING). Obviously, these facilities are subsidiary, and an increase in their number causes 
an increase in price. The third is the dummy variable (PREFAB), which is equal to 1, assigned to 
the supplier that belongs to the standardized construction section of the JAPe. As pointed out in 
Section 2, the member firms of this section specialize in temporary construction whereas other 
suppliers produce normal houses. As a result, the quality of the product of the former may be 
relatively lower than the latter. Therefore, it is expected that the effective price of housing has a 
negative relation to this dummy variable. 
Regarding the nature of the contract, two explanatory variables are considered in our 
analysis. One is the dummy variable (SALES), which assigns 1 to the sales contrace. By 
presupposing that temporary housing is provided for a period of two years, it is conceivable that 
the price of houses procured by lease contract would be lower than that procured by sales 
contract. Hence, we expect that the effective price of housing has a positive relation to this 
variable. The other is the dummy (PUBLIC), which shows whether the contract is based on 
inviting tenders from the public. Although discrete contracts are used to procure the temporary 
housing, there is an element of competition in the procurement when it involves inviting tenders 
from the publicS. Therefore, it is conceivable that the price of housing has a negative relation to 
7 The member firms of the standard construction section of JAPe typically lease the houses to the 
prefecture unless the total number of temporary houses exceeds about 10,000. On the other hand, 
other firms normally sell the houses. 
8 As mentioned in the end of section 2, the local government such as city and town can procure 
temporary houses by its own budget. In fact, after the East Japan Earthquake some local governments 
decided to procure temporary houses by their own judgment. The existence ofthis type of procurement 
may also promote competition. A remarkable example is the case of Sumida town in Iwate prefecture. 
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this variable. 
Finally, it should be noted that each prefecture has the responsibility for procuring 
temporary houses. In the light of the different constraints that each prefecture faces, they each 
take a different stance on procurement. To control for this difference, I introduce the dummy 
variables in my regression, assigning (IWATE) to Iwate prefecture and (FUKUSHIMA) to 
Fukushima prefecture whenever a discrete contract was concluded. Summary statistics of these 
variables are represented in Table 4. 
<See Table 4> 
Using these explanatory variables, we estimate the following simple linear regression 
equation. 
10g(ZP RlCE)=a + ~p i X + c, 
The result of OLS analysis based on this equation is shown in Table 5. From this table, 
we observe that all coefficients of the explanatory variables have expected signs. In addition, 
almost all the explanatory variables determine the dependent variable at a 5% significance level, 
except the coefficients of (FUKUSHIMA). Thus, it is confirmed that the above-mentioned 
factors actually play an important role in determining the price of the temporary housing. 
Especially, we should notice that the negative demand shock brought about by an ad hoc 
post-disaster response had a very effective impact on the procurement of temporary housing. 
<See Table 5> 
5. INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN PRE-DISASTER RULES AND POST-DISASTER 
RESPONSE 
As Kydland & Prescott (1977) demonstrated in the framework of dynamic 
control theory, time-inconsistency is a very important problem when considering 
various economic policies. Their point is that discretionary policy, even when it is 
the best action given the situation at that time, is an obstacle to attaining optimal 
economic performance. In order to describe this point in a simpler manner, consider 
Sumida town concluded discrete contract with the construction firms located in this town immediately 
after the disaster, and procured temporary houses (made of wood) at a low price. 
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the famous example suggested by Fischer (1980). Suppose that in a university, a 
professor wants her students to study hard. To encourage the students to study, she 
announces a term examination at the end of the semester. However, on the date of 
the exam, both the professor and students find that to sit an examination is not 
optimal, because the professor incurs opportunity cost to set the examination and 
the students have studied hard for the exam. Therefore, when the students 
anticipate that the professor will deviate from her announcement, the students will 
not study hard in the fIrst place. Discretionary policy often leads people to 
anticipate deviation, and impedes the attainment of desired policy goals. 
A similar mechanism may be at work in the Japanese public procurement of 
temporary housing program. As discussed in Section 3, after the disaster, the 
Japanese government introduced the "deemed" temporary housing program in 
which a flat rented by the affected person herself is deemed as a temporary house 
under certain conditions. On the other hand, the general principle of Japanese 
pre-disaster rules was that government provided goods in kind that contributed to 
the victims' relief, as pointed out in Section 2. Moreover, the negative demand shock 
brought about by the introduction of this policy in fact had a strong impact on the 
procurement of temporary housing complexes, as shown in the previous section. 
Although this type of policy may be desirable for providing cheaper temporary 
housing promptly, glVen the post-disaster situation, it could cause the 
time-inconsistency problem by deviating from the pre-disaster rules. This may 
change the incentives and behaviors of the economic agents, and lead to adverse 
impacts on the society. In addition, in the case of the East Japan Earthquake, the 
extensive damage, which the Japanese government did not expect, forced it to 
pursue various discretionary policies that were vague under pre-disaster rules. This 
may also have contributed to magnifying the time-inconsistency problem. 
Actually, this problem may have caused some confusion with regard to the 
supply of temporary houses after the disaster. First, the negative demand shock 
meant that many suppliers that had prepared for the production of the original 
planned number of houses were overstocked with the materials for temporary 
housing. This experience may make the current suppliers unwilling to provide 
temporary houses. Second, the introduction of the "deemed" temporary housing 
program meant that the evacuees who had thought of renting a flat for themselves 
were also given a type of "voucher" for the "deemed" temporary houses. Obviously, 
this policy, which deviated from the Japanese pre-disaster rules, hampers 
incentives for individuals to work at preventing damage in future disasters and 
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hinders the pursuit of important policy objectives during the post-disaster period, 
namely, the preparedness for future disasters by individuals. Third, the policy may 
also confer negative effects on the equity among affected persons. The flats that the 
victims rent for themselves are designed for normal residence, whereas, on the 
contrary, the temporary houses are not necessarily designed that way. Thus, the 
quality between the former and the latter is different. In addition to this, the 
various types of temporary houses that were constructed in response to this 
large-scale disaster may have magnified this difference. As a result, the victims that 
were affected in the same way are treated differently, with adverse effects on the 
equity among them, 
As this case suggests, an ad hoc policy that is planned after a disaster, even 
when it seems to be desirable given the situation at the time, may not only bring the 
side effects but also have negative effects on the preparedness for future disasters. 
As the discussion on the time-inconsistency problem shows, an ad hoc policy often 
influences the incentives and behaviors of various economic agents for the future. In 
the meantime, to execute public procurement for relief after a large-scale disaster, it 
is crucial that the government follow ex-ante rules before a disaster and not deviate 
from these rules. 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper, by focusing on the Japanese temporary housing program after 
the East Japan Earthquake, I considered the important factors necessary to achieve 
the desired public procurement. Mter I explained the Japanese pre-disaster rules 
and post-disaster response, using empirical analysis, I showed that the effective 
price of temporary housing that is account of the trade-off between efficiency and 
quickness of emergency procurement was heavily influenced by the introduction of 
the ad hoc program. On the basis of this discussion, I pointed out that this ad hoc 
policy may cause a time-inconsistency problem and not only brings side effect but 
also has an adverse impact on the prevention of disasters. Then, we clarified that it 
is very important to maintain time-consistency for effective public procurement 
after disasters. 
It is well-known that a commitment to policy rule by government is necessary 
to avoid a time-inconsistency problem. Of course, to this end, the government 
should clarify its pre-disaster rules for the public, as a World Bank report (2010) 
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emphasized. The design for these rules, which should be prepared before disasters, 
are very difficult task for the government. Moreover, designed rules are not always 
desirable ex post to the society. Nevertheless, the Japanese experience teaches us 
that government should minimize pursuing a discretionary policy and should not 
pursue a policy that deviates from ex-ante rules. Although post-disaster situations 
often tempt the government to introduce discretionary policy, the government 
should follow the narrow path that is consistent with pre-disaster rules. 
Of course, this narrow path is a very difficult one for the government to pursue. 
Needless to say, in order for the government to follow that path, it is crucial that it 
maintains transparent procurement activity. In other words, the appropriate 
disclosure of ex-ante rules and post-disaster response methods will encourage the 
commitment to rules and avoid the time-inconsistency problem. 
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Table 1: The extent of damage brought about by the East Japan and Hanshin-Awaji 
earthquakes 
East Japan Hanshin-Awaji 
Earthquake Earthquake 
Date March 11,2011 January 17, 1995 
Magnitude (Richter scale) M9.0 M7.3 
The number of deaths 15,854 6,434 
The number of missing 3,143 3 
The number of destroyed houses 129,286 104,906 
The number of seriously damaged houses 254,632 144,274 
The amount of direct damage 16.9 trillion Yen 9.6 trillion Yen 
($203.6 billion) ($120 billion) 
Source: This table is created by organizing the figures of the following sources. 
1) Japanese National Police Agency, "The situation of damages resulted by Tohoku 
Earthquake and the police activities after the quake" (on 28th March, 2012), 
2) Japanese Cabinet Office, "On the estimation of the amount of direct damages caused 
by East Japan Earthquake" (on 24th June, 2012), 
3) Japanese Fire and Disaster Management Agency, "On the Hanshin-Awaji 
Earthquake (definite figures)" (on 19th May, 2006). 
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Figure 1: The number of prefectures concluding agreements with JAPe 
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Source: JAPe, "The list of agreements on constructing temporary houses after disaster" 
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Table 2: Main events and response related to the temporary housing program 
Date Main Event or Response 
II-Mar Eruption of East Japan Earthquake 
Japanese government requires JAPC to prepare to supply 
temporary houses. 
12-Mar JAPC sets up disaster headquarters within its organization. 
Japanese government requires industry associations of house 
I4-Mar builders to supply 30,000 temporary houses within the next 
2 months. 
Three main prefectures affected require JAPC to supply 
32,800 temporary houses. 
19-Mar Construction begins in Iwate prefecture (Rikuzentakata City) 
23-Mar 
Construction begins in Fukushima prefecture (Kunimi 
Town) 
28-Mar Construction begins in Miyagi prefecture (13 complexes) 
31-Mar 
First phase of the temporary housing complex completed 
(Rikuzentakata City) 
Japanese government announces that planned number of 
temporary houses is 72,290. 
Iwate: 18,000/Miyagi: 30,000/Fukushima: 24,000 
30-Apr 
Japanese government announces the introduction of 
"deemed" temporary housing program. 
19-May 
Japanese government revises planned number of temporary 
houses downward to 52,200. 
Iwate: 14,000 I Miyagi: 23,000 I Fukushima: 15,200 
II-Aug All temporary houses are completed in Iwate prefecture. 
28-Sep All temporary houses are completed in Miyagi prefecture. 
Note: In Fukushima prefecture, the construction of temporary houses is in progress at present. 
Source: This table is created by organizing the information ofthe following sources. 
1) The documents provided by JAPe, 2) The notice by Japanese Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, "On 
the treatment of requisitioning of private rented flat as temporary houses" (on 30th April, 2011), 3) Japanese 
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, "On the Outlook (revision) for the completion of 
temporary houses" (on 19th May, 2011), 4) Iwate Prefecture, "On the plan progressing for the construction of 
temporaryhouses .. (http://www.pref.iwate.jp/view.rbz?nd=4294&of=1&ik=1&pnp=53&pnp=4201&pnp=4293 
&pnp=4294&cd=31658), 5) Miyagi Prefecture, "Report on the construction of temporary houses in Miyagi prefecture" 
(http://www.pref.miyagi.jp/juutaku/saigaijouhou/201201 1 8kensetu houkoku.pdf). 
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Table 3: The data on first-stage and second-stage evacuation after the disaster 
House of First-stage 
Accommodations Second-stage 




(the number of (the number (the number (the number 
number of 
persons) 
persons) of persons) of persons) of houses) 
2011/3118 NA NA NA 386,739 NA 
201113/25 NA NA NA 246,190 NA 
20111411 NA NA NA 167,919 NA 
201114111 NA NA NA 147,536 NA 
201115111 NA NA NA 115,098 NA 
201116/2 41,143 28,014 32,483 101,640 29,265 
201116116 31,297 27,427 25,612 84,336 42,971 
201116/30 24,182 25,273 19,361 68,816 52,386 
201117114 17,798 22,910 18,214 58,922 68,223 
201117/28 12,905 19,918 18,874 51,697 76,023 
201118111 8,646 13,584 20,514 42,744 82,866 
2011/8/25 6,819 10,814 20,407 38,040 88,897 
2011/9/8 3,439 6,411 17,681 27,531 92,123 
2011/9122 2,840 4,337 17,683 24,860 95,540 
2011110/6 1,719 2,877 17,303 21,899 98,076 
2011110/20 1,069 2,115 17,293 20,477 100,852 
201111112 933 1,266 17,277 19,476 102,833 
Note: The facilities for second-stage evacuation are public housing, temporary houses, 
"deemed" temporary houses and hospitals. 
Source: Japan Reconstruction Agency, "The number of refugees in the whole of Japan" 
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Table 4: Summary statistics of the variables 
Variables Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
In(zprice) 9.059 0.185 8.217 9.862 
In(LABOR) -0.473 0.300 -0.821 0.010 
DEMAND 0.860 0.129 0.633 1.000 
In(HOUSE) 3.575 0.929 1.386 5.756 
MEETING 0.701 0.604 0.000 4.000 
PREFAB 0.586 0.493 0.000 1.000 
SALES 0.861 0.346 0.000 1.000 
PUBUC 0.161 0.368 0.000 1.000 
IWATE 0.326 0.469 0.000 1.000 
FUKUSHIMA 0.213 0.410 0.000 1.000 
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Table 5: Result of regression analysis 
Explanatory Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
variables t value t value t value t value 
In(zprice) estimation 1 estimation 2 estimation 3 estimation 4 
Const. 9.843 a 9.806 a 9.849 a 9.827 a 
196.38 191.79 199.82 194.13 
In(LABOR) 0.327 a 0.336 a 
7.03 7.47 
DEMAND -0.410 a -0.627 a -0.406 a -0.633 a 
-7.77 -14.25 -7.74 -14.38 
In(HOUSE) -0.055 a -0.060 a -0.055 a -0.059 a 
-9.41 -10.12 -9.39 -9.90 
MEETING 0.036 a 0.037 a 0.036 a 0.041 a 
4.01 4.09 4.16 4.54 
PREFAB -0.115 a -0.109 a -0.117 a -0.115 a 
-10.20 -9.43 -10.63 -10.17 
SALES 0.081 a 0.100 a 0.078 a 0.090 a 
5.13 6.29 5.15 5.81 
PUBLIC -0.210 a -0.223 a -0.207 a -0.212 a 
-12.97 -13.52 -13.30 -13.28 
IWATE -0.227 a -0.037 a -0.235 a -0.049 a 
-7.79 -3.32 -8.79 -4.89 
FUKUSHIMA 0.010 0.035 b 
0.71 2.54 
R2 0.493 0.467 0.494 0.464 
F value 102.81 104.08 115.66 104.08 
Note: * The number of samples (942 samples) consists of 307 samples in Iwate prefecture, 434 in 
Miyagi and 201 in Fukushima. 
20 
